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PEDALING TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE TAX-RIDE FOR 
CYCLISTS 
INTRODUCTION 
With the beginning of each new decade comes a time for reflection on the 
past and speculation about the future.  As we look back over the last ten years, 
wrought with turbulence and conflict, it is tempting to feel angst about what 
will come.  Our country—its heart and stability—was challenged in an 
unparalleled way.  From feelings of despair and anger after 9/11 and 
helplessness after the stock market collapsed, to feelings of frustration caused 
by the heated debate over climate change and the global energy crisis, as a 
nation, we were forced to redefine who we are and what values we hold dear.  
In time, we emerged from the rubble of the Twin Towers and rallied around 
our troops, vowed to hold our peers accountable and rebuild Wall Street, and 
joined together to develop alternative energy sources.  Bred from that passion 
and loyalty we committed not only to dealing with the present, but also to 
preparing for the future—our country’s future.  So instead of merely looking to 
the future with angst, we may also look with optimism because, above all, we 
remain united. 
One of the most comprehensive examples of our collective efforts to 
rebuild the nation is the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the 
Bailout Bill), which President George W. Bush signed into law on October 3, 
2008.1  The purpose of the Bailout Bill was to provide stability to the economy 
through federal acquisition of assets and to promote energy production and tax 
relief through amendments to the Internal Revenue Code (the Tax Code).2  One 
of the Bailout Bill’s amendments to the Tax Code extended a tax incentive to 
employees who elect to ride a bicycle to work.3  Section 211 made certain 
 
 1. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 2. Id.  The Act’s stated purpose was: 
To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of 
troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the 
economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 to provide incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend 
certain expiring provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other 
purposes. 
Id. 
 3. Id. § 211, 122 Stat. at 3840–41. 
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reimbursements from employers to employees for expenses incurred 
commuting from home to work by bicycle nontaxable.4  Reimbursements by 
employers to employees for the purchase, maintenance, and storage bicycles 
were all included.5  No such benefit was provided to employees prior to the 
Bailout Bill; thus, the amendment was met with relief and optimism by bicycle 
advocates who had been attempting to implement such a provision for years.6  
Andy Thornley, the program director for the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, 
stated that this amendment “significantly legitimize[d] bicycling and elevate[d] 
it to a credible commute mode, like riding a bus or train.”7 
Despite the initial excitement, some cyclists have expressed concern that 
the maximum nontaxable reimbursement will not cover their actual bicycle-
related commuting expenses.8  Such concern is well founded.  The National 
Bicycle Dealers Association reported that the average price for bicycles sold in 
2009 was $500;9 however, the maximum excludable nontaxable 
reimbursement is $20/month (or $240/year).10  Another concern with the 
current provision is that employees are not permitted to concurrently receive 
nontaxable reimbursements for bicycle commuting expenses and nontaxable 
reimbursements for other similar commuting expenses.11  Specifically, 
employees are prohibited from receiving nontaxable reimbursements for 
commuting by bicycle and nontaxable reimbursements for using mass transit 
(such as bus or light-rail systems) or nontaxable reimbursements for 
commuting by bicycle and nontaxable reimbursements for carpooling.12  For 
example, if Phil rode his bike to the subway and then took the subway to work, 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Rachel Gordon, Bailout Gives Cyclists a Leg Up; As of January, Bike Commuters Can 
Get $20-a-month, Tax-free Reimbursement, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2008, at B1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Industry Overview 2009, NAT’L BICYCLE DEALERS ASS’N, http://nbda.com/articles/ 
industry-overview-2009-pg34.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
 10. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (Supp. II 2009) (“The term ‘applicable annual limitation’ means, 
with respect to any employee for any calendar year, the product of $20 multiplied by the number 
of qualified bicycle commuting months during such year.”). 
 11. Id. § 132(f)(2). 
The amount of the fringe benefits which are provided by an employer to any employee 
and which may be excluded from gross income under subsection (a)(5) shall not exceed—
(A) $100 per month in the case of the aggregate of [transportation in a commuter highway 
vehicle and any transit pass], (B) $175 per month in the case of qualified parking, and (C) 
the applicable limitation in the case of any qualified bicycle commuting reimbursement. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 12. Id. § 132(f)(5)(F)(iii)(II) (stating that bicycle reimbursements may only be excluded 
when no other qualified transportation benefit is received by the employee).  See infra text 
accompanying notes 69–70 (explaining the definitions of “commuter highway vehicles” and 
“mass transit” benefits). 
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Phil could not receive nontaxable reimbursements from his employer for the 
costs he incurred for the bicycle and the subway ticket.  Similarly, if Phil rode 
his bike in good weather and carpooled in bad weather, Phil could not receive 
nontaxable reimbursements from his employer for the costs incurred for the 
bicycle and for carpooling expenses. 
In response to these concerns, on July 21, 2009, Representative Edward 
Blumenauer proposed House Resolution 3271 (the Green Routes to Work Act), 
which would expand the current benefits available to employees commuting by 
bicycle.13  Under the proposed Green Routes to Work Act, employees would 
be permitted to exclude bicycle commuting reimbursements and mass transit 
benefits.14  Using the example from above, if Phil rode his bike to the subway 
and then took the subway to work, Phil could receive nontaxable 
reimbursements from his employer for the costs incurred for the bicycle and 
for his subway ticket. 
However, the proposed Green Routes to Work Act is not without flaws.  
Notably, the proposed Green Routes to Work Act would not increase the 
maximum amount of nontaxable reimbursements for bicycle commuting 
expenses an employee can receive.  Nor would the proposed bill allow 
employees to receive nontaxable reimbursements for bicycle commuting 
expenses and carpooling expenses.15  So under the proposed Green Routes to 
Work Act, Phil could receive nontaxable reimbursements for riding his bike to 
the subway and taking the subway to work but not for riding his bike to a 
friend’s house and then carpooling to work. 
Although the income tax system exists foremost to produce revenue for the 
federal government, it also is used to promote social and economic goals.16  By 
electing to tax some activities and not others, Congress creates monetary 
incentives and disincentives that encourage or discourage taxpayers to engage 
in those activities.17  Thus, Congress makes “fundamental social and economic 
 
 13. Green Routes to Work Act, H.R. Res. 3271, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 14. Id. § 9(a) (“Subclause (II) of section 132(f)(5)(F)(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 (defining qualified bicycling month) is amended by striking ‘, (B),’.”). 
 15. See id. § 9(a)–(d).  See also id. § 2(a) (“Paragraph (2) of section 132(f) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to limitation on exclusion) is amended—(1) by striking ‘$100’ in 
subparagraph (A) and inserting ‘$230’, and (2) by striking ‘$175’ in subparagraph (B) and 
inserting ‘$230’.”); I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (“The term ‘applicable annual limitation’ means, 
with respect to any employee for any calendar year, the product of $20 multiplied by the number 
of qualified bicycle commuting months during such year.”). 
 16. Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation Choice, 
24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 620 (2005).  See also Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to 
Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 687 (2002) (explaining 
taxes may be seen as a means of generating revenue or achieving policy goals). 
 17. Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 26 VA. TAX REV. 185, 187 (2006).  See also Cavanaugh, 
supra note 16, at 687 (“[G]overnments generally (and Congress in particular), have frequently 
used both tax incentives and disincentives in an effort to address important social problems.”). 
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judgments” when deciding which activities should be taxed.18  Which activities 
are encouraged and discouraged within our tax code reveals “a certain vision 
of the self and the way in which that self is situated in various contexts” which 
reflects the way we perceive “our families, communities, and workplaces.”19  
As a result, the changes the Bailout Bill made to the Tax Code and the 
proposed changes within the Green Routes to Work Act are important not only 
from a political perspective looking at how such legislation will affect tax law 
and our economy directly, but they are also important from a sociological 
perspective because “our income tax rules reflect and shape the society in 
which we live and the nature of the communities we prefer.”20 
One of the fundamental purposes of the Bailout Bill was to provide 
incentives for energy conservation.21  This purpose was arguably an attempt to 
mitigate the global energy crisis, but at the very least embodies the “green” 
trend.  “[G]reen is everywhere these days—in the news, politics, fashion, and 
even technology.”22  By making certain reimbursements from employers to 
employees for expenses incurred commuting from home to work by bicycle 
nontaxable, Congress created a financial incentive to encourage employees to 
ride their bicycles to work which, in a sense, reflects our society’s “green” 
trends. 
Nonetheless, historically Congress has been criticized for attempting to 
advance social policy through the tax system.23  These critics argue that using 
the tax system to promote social goals distorts the marketplace and 
disproportionately benefits taxpayers with higher incomes.24  Both the 
amendments to the Tax Code within the Bailout Bill and the proposed 
amendments contained in the Green Routes to Work Act are vulnerable to such 
attacks.  However, I argue that incentivizing bicycle transportation through the 
Tax Code is not subject to the same criticisms as are other policy initiatives 
and, in fact, should be aggressively expanded and afforded more equitable tax 
 
 18. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (6th ed. 2009). 
 19. Dagan, supra note 17, at 188. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also supra note 2. 
 22. How to Go Green: Why to Go Green, PLANETGREEN.COM, http://planetgreen. 
discovery.com/go-green/ultimate-go-green/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
 23. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 712–13. 
 24. Id.  See also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 719–25 
(1970) (arguing tax incentives provide windfalls for activities taxpayers would engage in anyway, 
are inequitable because they disproportionally benefit higher taxpayers, and distort the 
marketplace). 
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treatment in comparison to other similar nontaxable transportation benefits 
within the Tax Code. 
Part I describes the tax treatment of bicycle commuting expenses within 
the Tax Code and draws distinctions between this and other similar benefit 
categories.  By reflecting on relevant legislation and interpretation of the Tax 
Code by the courts, Part II chronicles the thirty-year progression that has 
resulted in the present inequitable tax treatment for bicycle reimbursements.  
This explanation serves as the foundation for my argument that these benefits 
should be expanded and equalized with similar nontaxable benefits within the 
Tax Code.  Finally, Part III addresses many of the common arguments against 
using the Tax Code as a means to advance social policy initiatives.  In this 
Section, by highlighting sociological empirical data, I attempt to reconcile 
concerns about tax expenditures in general, with bicycle tax incentives 
specifically, and concurrently advocate their expansion within the Tax Code. 
I.  WHAT ARE NONTAXABLE BICYCLE COMMUTING REIMBURSEMENTS? 
In general, unless the Tax Code provides an exception, an individual must 
pay taxes on everything they receive of monetary value, whether it is cash, 
services, or goods.25  So generally, whenever an employee receives money 
from an employer, the employee must pay taxes on that money because it 
constitutes “gross income” under the Tax Code.  The Tax Code defines “gross 
income” as the taxable income a taxpayer accrues over the course of the year 
from “whatever source derived.”26  For example, wages, commissions, 
dividends, alimony payments, and lottery winnings all constitute taxable 
income.27 The aggregate of such receipts forms the taxpayer’s “gross 
income.”28 
The Bailout Bill provided an exception to the general rule for 
reimbursements from employers to employees for bicycle commuting 
expenses.29  Now, when an employer reimburses their employee for certain 
bicycle expenses, the employee does not have to pay taxes on that money.  At 
the macro level, the exception for bicycle transportation reimbursements is a 
tax expenditure.  At the micro level, the exception is defined as a qualified 
transportation fringe benefit.  An explanation of bicycle transportation 
reimbursements as a tax expenditure and a qualified transportation fringe 
 
 25. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 26. Id. (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from 
whatever source derived.”). 
 27. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 23.  See also I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (explaining some of 
the receipts of income that are included in the calculation of an employees gross income). 
 28. I.R.C. § 61(a). 
 29. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 211, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3840–41 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132(f)). 
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benefit is essential to understanding why the current treatment of bicycle 
reimbursements is inequitable and forms the foundation for why I argue for 
their expansion throughout this Comment. 
A. Tax Expenditures 
The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation defines “tax 
expenditures” as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax 
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross 
income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral 
of tax liability.”30  In other words, tax expenditures are reductions in tax 
liability from special provisions or regulations that provide benefits to 
taxpayers.31 
Because of their classification as nontaxable income, thereby receiving 
them from their general duty to pay tax on such income, bicycle 
reimbursements can be categorized as a tax expenditure.  However, nontaxable 
income in the form of an exclusion32 is only one type of tax expenditure.  
Deductions and credits are also forms of tax expenditures that constitute 
exceptions to the general rule that any income generated is taxable income.33  
Although exclusions, deductions, and credits are all tax expenditures that play 
a role in the calculation of a taxpayer’s total annual tax liability, they are very 
different from each other.34 
 
 30. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008–2012 (J. Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter 2008–2012 
ESTIMATES].  The Joint Committee on Taxation prepares estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures 
for the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance.  Id. at 1.  
See also Congressional Budget and Employment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88 Stat. 
937, 938  (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1302) (defining a tax expenditure as “revenue losses 
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a 
deferral of tax liability.”). 
 31. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007–2011 (J. Comm. Print 2008), reprinted in GRAETZ & 
SCHENK, supra note 18, at 41.  The Joint Committee on Taxation was established in 1926 and is 
comprised of members from both houses.  GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 68.  The Joint 
Committee on Taxation meets about three times per year and is intended to provide assistance to 
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.  Id.  The Joint 
Committee on Taxation “is responsible for estimating the revenue effects of legislative proposals 
and enacted legislation for the Congress.”  Id. 
 32. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 33. 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 3. 
 34. See generally I.R.C. Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B (discussing the computation of 
taxable income). 
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1. Deductions 
Tax deductions are beneficial to the taxpayer because they constitute sums 
of money that may be subtracted (i.e., deducted) from their gross income or 
adjusted gross income when calculating the total sum that will determine the 
taxpayer’s annual liability.35  There are many rules and restrictions governing 
deductions that limit which expenses paid out by a taxpayer during a year may 
be subtracted from the calculation of their annual gross income.36 
Deductions are only beneficial up to the total amount of an individual’s 
taxable income.37  For example, if a taxpayer has a gross income of $100 and 
$150 worth of eligible deductions, after the deductions are subtracted from the 
taxpayer’s gross income, the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income38 would be $0, 
which means the taxpayer cannot take advantage of the remaining $50 of 
deductions.  Essentially, the eligible deductions that exceed the taxpayer’s 
gross income are worthless. 
In addition, categorizing an expense as a deduction does not automatically 
benefit all taxpayers.  While some deductions are automatically deductible 
from an employee’s gross income,39 others, called “itemized deductions,” are 
only subtracted from an employee’s gross income if they are greater than the 
taxpayer’s standard deduction.40  Thus, a deduction does not always lower a 
taxpayer’s taxable income, so it does not necessarily benefit the taxpayer. 
2. Credits 
In contrast, a tax credit is applied against a taxpayer’s tax liability as 
determined based on their adjusted gross income.41  Some tax credits are 
refundable and others are not.42  Refundable credits benefit all taxpayers 
regardless of their taxable income.43  If a taxpayer’s tax liability is less than the 
applicable refundable credits, then the taxpayer will receive a check (i.e., cash) 
 
 35. I.R.C. § 62(a) (2006).  See also GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 228 (explaining 
deductions in general). 
 36. I.R.C. § 62(a).  See also GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 228. 
 37. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229. 
 38. I.R.C. § 62. 
 39. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 228. 
 40. I.R.C. § 63(c); see 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 37.  See also GRAETZ & 
SCHENK, supra note 18, at 24 (explaining the difference between itemized and standard 
deductions).  “The standard deduction is a flat amount specified by the Code that varies with 
marital status, which the taxpayer may deduct regardless of actual expenses.”  Id. 
 41. See I.R.C. §§ 21–54AA (listing available tax credits). 
 42. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229.  Compare I.R.C. § 21 (describing the 
nonrefundable credit for “[e]xpenses for household and dependent care services necessary for 
gainful employment”), with I.R.C. § 32 (describing the refundable credit for “[e]arned income”). 
 43. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229.  See also I.R.C. §§ 32–54AA (codifying tax 
credits). 
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for the difference.44  On the other hand, nonrefundable credits are only 
beneficial up to the amount of a taxpayer’s tax liability.45  A taxpayer does not 
receive a refund when his nonrefundable credit(s) are larger than his tax 
liability.46  Thus, the maximum benefit a taxpayer will receive from a 
nonrefundable credit will be a total tax liability of $0. 
3. Exclusions 
Finally, exclusions like the one for bicycle transportation reimbursements, 
are different than both refunds and credits because they are taken into 
consideration when determining a taxpayer’s initial gross income.47  When an 
item is defined as an exclusion, the amount of the item’s worth is not 
considered income for purposes of calculating a taxpayer’s gross income.48  
Because of the limits described above on deductions, taxpayers generally 
prefer exclusions over deductions.49 
As stated earlier, the Bailout Bill provided an exception to the general rule 
that all income is taxable.  Specifically, the Bailout Bill amended the Tax Code 
so that some reimbursements from employers to employees for bicycle 
commuting expenses would not constitute taxable income.50  In other words, 
the income would be excluded from the calculation of the employee’s gross 
income.  Without the Bailout Bill provision, if an employer reimbursed 
employees for bicycle expenses, the employees would have to pay tax on that 
reimbursement. 
B. Qualified Transportation Fringe Benefits 
In addition to being defined as an exclusion under the Tax Code, 
nontaxable bicycle commuting reimbursements and other similar commuting 
reimbursements are also defined as qualified transportation fringe benefits.51  
All qualified transportation fringe benefits are also considered “tax 
 
 44. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229. 
 45. Id.  See also I.R.C. §§ 21–26 (codifying nonrefundable personal tax credits). 
 46. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229. 
 47. See generally I.R.C. §§ 101–803 (codifying exclusions from gross income). 
 48. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 93 (1973) (“The device of exclusion from gross income—the amount involved 
simply need not be counted as income of the taxpayer in the computation of his gross income—is 
used for all of the tax expenditure items benefiting the individual as wage or salary earner.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 49. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 228.  There are very technical rules defining 
which deductions are allowable and in what circumstances.  See id.  Such differences will not be 
addressed in this paper. 
 50. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 211, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3840–41 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132(f)). 
 51. I.R.C. § 132(f)(1) (Supp. II 2009). 
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expenditures.”52  But in order to fully understand the interplay between bicycle 
commuting reimbursements and other similar (and more favorably treated) 
commuting benefits, a more thorough analysis of the definition of qualified 
transportation fringe benefits is required. 
1. Fringe Benefits Generally 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “fringe benefit” as “a perquisite or 
benefit of some kind provided by an employer to supplement a money wage or 
salary.”53  Other common examples of fringe benefits to employees include 
employee discounts for products or services and retirement plans.54 
Most fringe benefits constitute receipts of taxable income because, in 
general, fringe benefits from employers constitute gross income and are, 
therefore, taxable as part of an employee’s gross income.55  Congress carved 
out the following exceptions to the general rule (including qualified 
transportation fringe benefits) that employees may exclude from their gross 
income: 1) no-additional-cost services;56 2) qualified employee discounts;57 3) 
working condition fringe;58 4) de minimis fringe;59 5) qualified transportation 
fringe;60 6) qualified moving expense reimbursements;61 7) qualified 
retirement planning services;62 and 8) qualified military base realignment and 
closure fringe.63  Bicycle commuting reimbursements, in addition to commuter 
highway vehicle, transit pass, and parking nontaxable benefits, are defined as 
qualified transportation fringe benefits.64 
 
 52. See I.R.C. § 132(a) (2006) (explaining which fringe benefits are excluded from gross 
income); 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 38. 
 53. Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section 132 After Twenty Years, 25 
VA. TAX REV. 977, 980–81 (2006) (quoting THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 200 (2d ed. 
1989)). 
 54. I.R.C. § 132(c), (m) (2006). 
 55. Id. § 61(a)(1); 2008–2012 ESTIMATES , supra note 30, at 15. 
 56. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1). 
 57. Id. § 132(a)(2). 
 58. Id. § 132(a)(3). 
 59. Id. § 132(a)(4). 
 60. Id. § 132(a)(5). 
 61. I.R.C. § 132(a)(6). 
 62. Id. § 132(a)(7). 
 63. Id. § 132(a)(8). 
 64. I.R.C. § 132(f)(1)(D) (Supp. II 2009). 
For purposes of this section, the term “qualified transportation fringe” means any of the 
following provided by an employer to an employee: (A) Transportation in a commuter 
highway vehicle if such transportation is in connection with travel between the 
employee’s residence and place of employment.  (B) Any transit pass.  (C) Qualified 
parking.  (D) Any qualified bicycle commuting reimbursement. 
Id. § 132(f)(1)(A)–(D). 
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2. Qualified Transportation Fringe Benefits Specifically 
Prior to the Bailout Bill,65 which added the bicycle commuting 
reimbursement, there were only three types of qualified transportation fringe 
benefits: 1) transportation in commuter highway vehicles (carpooling);66 2) 
transit passes;67 and 3) qualified parking.68  First, commuter highway vehicles 
seat at least six adults (not including the driver) and are used primarily for 
carpooling employees between their residence and place of employment.69  
Second, transit passes consist of “any pass, token, farecard, voucher, or similar 
item” for transportation on mass transit facilities.70  Third, qualified parking 
must be located on or near either the business premises or the location where 
the employee connects with mass transit or carpool.71  Finally, bicycle 
commuting reimbursements constitute any employer reimbursement to the 
employee for “the purchase of a bicycle and bicycle improvements, repair, and 
storage, if such bicycle is regularly used for travel between the employee’s 
residence and place of employment.”72 
3. The Bicycle Commuting Reimbursement 
Despite their recent addition to the category of excludable qualified 
transportation fringe benefits, the limitations on eligible bicycle commuting 
reimbursements are much stricter than those for other types of qualified 
transportation fringe benefits. 
Under the current statute, employees are very limited by the types of 
transportation benefits that may be concurrently excluded and the maximum 
exclusions for each.  Only commuter highway vehicle and transit pass benefits 
may be combined and excluded.73  Thus, employees may exclude: commuter 
highway vehicle and transit pass benefits or parking benefits or bicycle 
 
 65. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (discussing the Bailout Bill). 
 66. I.R.C. § 132(f)(1)(A) (2006). 
 67. Id. § 132(f)(1)(B). 
 68. Id. § 132(f)(1)(C). 
 69. Id. § 132(f)(5)(B).  At least 80% of the vehicle’s mileage must be acquired “for purposes 
of transporting employees in connection with travel between their residences and their place of 
employment, and on trips during which the number of employees transported for such purposes is 
at least ½ of the adult seating capacity of such vehicle (not including the driver).”  Id. § 
132(f)(5)(B)(ii). 
 70. Id. § 132(f)(5)(A).  Such mass transportation facilities may be either private or publicly 
owned.  Id. § 132(f)(5)(A)(i). 
 71. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(C). 
 72. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(i) (Supp. II 2009). 
 73. I.R.C. §§ 132(f)(1), 132 (f)(2)(A) (2006). 
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reimbursements.74  In addition, within the categories of excludable 
transportation reimbursements, there is a great disparity between the categories 
based on their maximum exclusions.75  As articulated in Section 132(f) of the 
Tax Code, employees may exclude up to $2,100/year ($175/month) in parking 
benefits76 or $1,200/year ($100/month) in commuter highway vehicle and 
transit pass benefits,77 whereas employees are only permitted to exclude 
$240/year ($20/month) in bicycle reimbursement benefits.78 
Although the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 
temporarily increased and equalized the maximum excludable transportation 
fringe benefit for parking and the combination of commuter highway vehicle 
and transit passes to $2,760/year, bicycle reimbursements were casually 
ignored.79 
When juxtaposed against the other choices for eligible exclusions, 
employees are likely to be discouraged from choosing to exclude bicycle 
transportation reimbursements instead of parking or transit pass or commuter 
highway vehicle benefits.  Why would a taxpayer turn down a more convenient 
parking benefit worth $2,100/year or a transit benefit worth $1,200/year, for a 
bicycle benefit worth $240/year?  I argue that employees should be able to 
concurrently exclude commuter highway vehicle and transit pass and bicycle 
reimbursements, and at a minimum, the aggregate exclusion should be equal to 
the maximum exclusion for parking benefits. 
 
 74. See I.R.C. § 132(f)(2) (Supp. II 2009) (describing the three categories of exclusions); id. 
§ 132(f)(5)(F)(iii)(II) (stating bicycle reimbursements may only be excluded when no other 
transportation benefit is received by the employee). 
 75. Compare I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(A) (2006) (describing the maximum exclusion for commuter 
highway vehicle and transit pass benefits) and id. § 132(f)(2)(B) (describing the maximum 
exclusion for parking benefits), with I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (Supp. II 2009) (describing the 
maximum exclusion for bicycle reimbursements). 
 76. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(B) (Supp. II 2009) (“The amount of the fringe benefits which are 
provided by an employer to any employee and which may be excluded from gross income under 
subsection (a)(5) shall not exceed . . . $175 per month in the case of qualified parking.”). 
 77. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(A) (2006). 
The amount of the fringe benefits which are provided by an employer to any employee 
and which may be excluded from gross income under subsection (a)(5) shall not exceed 
$100 per month in the case of the aggregate of the benefits described in subparagraphs 
(A) and (B) of paragraph (1). 
Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) describe transportation in a commuter highway 
vehicle and transit passes, respectively.  Id. § 132(f)(1)(A)–(B). 
 78. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (Supp. II 2009) (“The term ‘applicable annual limitation’ means, 
with respect to any employee for any calendar year, the product of $20 multiplied by the number 
of qualified bicycle commuting months during such year.”). 
 79. American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-5, § 1151(a), 
123 Stat. 115, 333 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132). 
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II.  HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF COMMUTING EXPENSES 
As stated in the introduction, the Tax Code has been a means of raising 
revenue for the federal government and a means of encouraging certain social 
policy objectives.80  A brief summary of how the courts, legislators, and the 
Internal Revenue Service have historically defined employee commuting 
expenses is necessary to understand why I argue that the bicycle 
reimbursement should receive favorable tax treatment and the exclusion should 
be expanded. 
A. Commuting Expenses Generally Not Deductible 
Historically, expenses incurred by an individual as a result of traveling 
from his home to work have been considered a personal expense that is not 
deductible81 from an employee’s gross income.82  The basis of this policy is 
that commuting expenses should not be considered deductible business 
expenses because “an employee does not incur such expenses in the direct 
pursuit of his employer’s trade or business.”83  Rather, commuting expenses 
should be codified as “personal, living, or family expenses”84 because they 
reflect a taxpayer’s individual choice of where to live in relation to where they 
work.85 
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Flowers, the Supreme Court 
upheld the lower Tax Court’s finding that expenses incurred when traveling 
from home to work constituted living and personal expenses, as opposed to 
traveling expenses in pursuit of trade or business; therefore, such expenses 
were not deductible from an employee’s gross income.86  The Court explained 
that an employee’s business-travel expenses are distinct from an employee’s 
 
 80. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 687. 
 81. Emphasizing deductible as opposed to excludable. 
 82. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2006); Wendy Gerzog Shaller, Limit Deductions for Mixed 
Personal/Business Expenses: Curb Current Abuses and Restore Some Progressivity Into the Tax 
Code, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 581, 591 (1992). 
 83. I.R.C. § 162(a) (defining ordinary business expenses); William P. Kratzke, The 
(Im)balance of Externalities in Employment-Based Exclusions from Gross Income, 60 TAX LAW. 
1, 46 (2006) (citing Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473 (1946)). 
 84. I.R.C. § 262(a); see also United States v. Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243, 246 (10th Cir. 1969) 
(“Such travels are expenses within section 262 as ‘personal, living or family expenses’ whether in 
an urban, suburban, or rural setting.  They are not ordinary business expenses under section 
162(a).”). 
 85. Dagan, supra note 17, at 202; Kratzke, supra note 83, at 46. 
 86. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 471–72.  Section 23(a)(1)(A) is now codified in Section 162 
pertaining to trade or business expenses.  See I.R.C. § 162.  See also Sullivan v. Comm’r, 1 
B.T.A. 93, 93 (1924) (“The cost of transportation paid by an individual living at a distance from 
his place of business, in going to and returning from such place of business, is not deductible as a 
business expense.  The operating cost, including depreciation, of an automobile so used by an 
individual is not deductible as a business expense.”). 
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daily transportation expenses because “[t]he exigencies of business rather than 
the personal conveniences and necessities of the traveler must be the 
motivating factors” for the travel.87  In other words, an employee’s expenses 
for having to travel from their home office located in St. Louis, Missouri to 
New York, New York for a convention are different than an employee’s daily 
commuting expenses from their home in St. Charles, Missouri to their office 
located in downtown St. Louis, Missouri. 
Both the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have strictly interpreted 
the Tax Code in their recognition of travel expenses as inherently personal.88  
For example, neither a taxpayer’s special circumstances due to physical 
impairments necessitating alternative transportation arrangements like a 
taxicab89 or a specially designed automobile,90 nor circumstances prohibiting 
the taxpayer to live on or near the premises91 have been sanctioned as a 
deductible travel expense.92 
The Internal Revenue Service’s and the Supreme Court’s seemingly 
concrete stance on the tax treatment of commuting expenses appears at odds 
with my argument that not only should certain commuting expenses be treated 
favorably, but that they should be treated more favorably than deductions by 
being treated as an exclusion.  Such juxtaposition may be reconciled when 
considering the evolution of the tax on commuting expenses following the 
 
 87. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 474.  The regulations to the Code explain “[i]f the trip is 
undertaken for other than business purposes, the travel fares and expenses incident to travel are 
personal expenses and the meals and lodging are living expenses.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.162-2 (2010). 
 88. See Coombs v. Comm’r, 608 F.2d 1269, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 1979); Sanders v. Comm’r, 
439 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1971); Tauferner, 407 F.2d at 246–47; Donnelly v. Comm’r, 262 F.2d 
411, 412 (2d. Cir. 1959); Bruton v. Comm’r, 9 T.C. 882, 886 (1947).  However, transportation 
expenses incurred in going from home to work will be deductible if: 1) The taxpayer is 
commuting between his home and a temporary work location outside the metropolitan area where 
the taxpayer lives and normally works; 2) The taxpayer has one or more regular locations away 
from the taxpayer’s home, the taxpayer may deduct the expenses of commuting between their 
home and a temporary work location in the same trade or business; or 3) The taxpayer’s home is 
his principal place of business.  Rev. Rul. 99-7, 1999-5 C.B. 361. 
 89. See Bruton, 9 T.C. at 886. 
 90. See Donnelly, 262 F.2d at 412. 
 91. Coombs, 608 F.2d at 1276–77; Sanders, 439 F.2d at 297; Tauferner, 407 F.2d at 246–47. 
 92. See Coombs, 608 F.2d at 1278–79; Sanders, 439 F.2d at 299; Tauferner, 407 F.2d at 
246–47; Donnelly, 262 F.2d at 412; Bruton, 9 T.C. at 886.  See also Brown v. Comm’r, 47 
T.C.M. (P-H) 3032, 3033 (1983) (holding that racial discrimination forcing a taxpayer to live 
farther away from his place of employment did not justify the taxpayer being treated differently 
than “any other taxpayers similarly situated with respect to deductibility of commuting 
expenses”); Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47 (“Employees may incur commuting expenses for 
personal reasons, but they are nevertheless an expense of establishing or maintaining a particular 
employment relationship.”). 
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Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which categorically changed the tax treatment 
of some transportation expenses under the Tax Code.93 
B. Carving Out the First Exception for Employee Commuting Expenses 
Not too unlike the purpose of the Bailout Bill, the purpose of the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act) was to provide tax reform and reduce 
the federal deficit.94  One substantial provision of the 1984 Act constituted the 
first action by Congress that established a means by which employers could 
relieve employees of some of their commuting expenses.95  The 1984 Act 
made some employer reimbursements for commuting expenses nontaxable.96 
In addition to establishing the general rule that fringe benefits constitute 
taxable income, this comprehensive legislation laid out four categories of 
benefits employers could provide to employees that would constitute 
nontaxable income.97  These categories were excluded for the purpose of 
administrative convenience to employers.98  Any fringe benefit not explicitly 
listed as an exception within the 1984 Act is deemed taxable and, thus, must be 
included in an employee’s gross income.99  The amount included in an 
employee’s gross income for non-excludable fringe benefits is equal to the fair 
market value of the fringe benefit.100 
 
 93. See infra Part II.B. 
 94. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1, 98 Stat. 494, 494 (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text for description of the 
purpose of the Bailout Bill. 
 95. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531, 98 Stat. at 877 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(h)(4)); 
Shaller, supra note 82, at 600.  The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 is divided into two sections: 
the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the Spending Reduction Act of 1984.  Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984 §1(b), 98 Stat. at 494.  Accordingly, some scholars have referred to legislation mentioned 
within this section as the Tax Reform Act of 1984.  See, e.g., Gazur, supra note 53, at 978. 
 96. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531, 98 Stat. at 878 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(h)(4)). 
 97. Id. § 531(a), 98 Stat. at 878 (amending I.R.C. § 132); Id. § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884 
(amending I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)). 
 98. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 707 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1591–92 
(1984)) (explaining the close relationship these benefits have with the employer’s business and 
the potential undue burden upon employers that would result from requiring valuation and 
reporting of these benefits). 
 99. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884 (amending I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)); 
Shaller, supra note 82, at 600–01.  But see Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 708 n.97 (“Parking 
provided at or near an employer’s business premises was excludable, regardless of its cost, as a 
working condition fringe benefit.  An employee’s commuting cost whether by transit pass, 
vouchers, or cash reimbursement by the employer up to twenty-one dollars per month was 
excluded as a de minimis fringe benefit.”) (emphasis in original). 
 100. 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-21(b) (2009) (“[T]he fair market value of a fringe benefit is the amount 
that an individual would have to pay for the particular fringe benefit in an arm’s-length 
transaction.”). 
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Under the 1984 Act, the four categories of benefits considered nontaxable 
were: 1) no-additional cost services;101 2) qualified employee discounts;102 3) 
working condition fringe;103 and 4) de minimis fringe.104  The 1984 Act 
categorized transit passes and parking benefits differently than their current 
treatment as transportation fringe benefits.105  Employee parking was 
considered a “working condition fringe.”106  The value of employee parking 
was excludable from the employee’s gross income as a working condition 
fringe benefit, so long as the parking facility was located on or near the 
business premises.107  In contrast, an employee’s commuting costs, which were 
reimbursed by an employer in the form of transit passes, vouchers, or cash 
reimbursements, were considered de minimis fringe benefits.108  While 
employees were permitted to exclude the total amount of parking benefits, 
regardless of their cost, employees were limited to excluding only $21/month 
in transit passes, vouchers, or cash reimbursements.109  With this initial 
categorical distinction created by the 1984 Act, the inequitable tax treatment of 
transportation benefits began. 
C. Creating the Category of Qualified Transportation Fringe Benefits 
In 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (the 1992 Act).110  The 
purpose of the 1992 Act was to enact laws that would improve energy 
efficiency.111  As part of the 1992 Act, Congress added qualified transportation 
fringe benefits to the category of nontaxable employer-provided benefits 
excludable from an employee’s gross income.112  This addition changed the 
former categorizations of employee parking as a working condition fringe 
benefit and transit benefits as de minimis fringe benefits.113  
Instead, the new category of qualified transportation fringe benefits 
included transportation provided by the employer by means of a commuter 
 
 101. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 878 (codified at I.R.C. § 
132(a)(1)). 
 102. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 132(a)(2)). 
 103. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 132(a)(3)). 
 104. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 132(a)(4)). 
 105. Compare I.R.C. § 132(f) (2006), with Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531(a), 98 Stat. at 
880 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(h)(4)). 
 106. Deficit Reduction Act § 531(a), 98 Stat. at 880 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(h)(4)). 
 107. Id.; ERNST & WHINNEY, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984: AN ANALYSIS OF 
SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS 16 (1984). 
 108. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 708 n.97. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2276 (1992). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. § 1911(b), 106 Stat. at 3012–13 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(a), (f)). 
 113. See id. 
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highway vehicle, a transit pass, or qualified parking.114  By creating a new 
category of benefits that grouped these similar types of transportation benefits 
together, Congress was able to cap the excludable parking benefit while 
increasing the tax incentive to use mass transit or commuter highway 
vehicles.115 
Employees were permitted to combine and exclude commuter highway 
vehicle and transit pass benefits.116  However, employees had to choose 
between excluding the combination of commuter highway vehicle and transit 
pass benefits or parking benefits.117  Employees could exclude up to 
$60/month in commuter highway vehicle and transit pass benefits or 
$155/month in parking benefits.118  Although Congress took a great step 
towards equalizing the treatment of similar types of benefits by reducing the 
disparity in the maximum amount of excludable reimbursements from 
employers from $20/month for transit passes and unlimited parking benefits, 
Congress still perpetuated the disparity between the value of parking benefits 
and other forms of transportation benefits.119 
D. Creating Severe Inequities between Qualified Transportation Fringe 
Benefits 
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (the 1997 Act) included one of the most 
controversial amendments to the employee fringe benefit provision.120  This 
amendment made parking benefits in lieu of cash compensation nontaxable as 
a qualified employee fringe benefit.121  In other words, an employer could offer 
employees a choice between a cash payment and a qualified parking benefit.122 
Prior to the 1997 Act, if an employer offered an employee a choice 
between $150 and free parking, the parking—in lieu of compensation—would 
 
 114. Id. § 1911(b), 106 Stat. at 3012–13; Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 708 n.96; Kratzke, 
supra note 83, at 46 (citing I.R.C. §§ 132(a)(5), 132(f)(1)(A)–(B)).  A transit pass includes any 
pass, token, farecard, voucher, or similar item entitling a person to transportation if such 
transportation is on mass transit facilities.  I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(A)(i). 
 115. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 708. 
 116. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1911(a), 106 Stat. at 3012. 
 117. Id. § 1911(b), 106 Stat. at 3012–13. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Compare id. § 1911(b), 106 Stat. at 3012–13, with I.R.C. § 132(f) (raising the excludable 
amounts to $100 per month in commuter highway vehicle and transit pass benefits or $175 per 
month in parking benefits). 
 120. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1072, 111 Stat. 788, 948 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 132(f)(4)).  See also infra text accompanying notes 131–32 (discussing criticisms of this 
amendment). 
 121. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1072, 111 Stat. at 948. 
 122. Id. 
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constitute taxable income, as opposed to a nontaxable fringe benefit.123  If the 
employee elected to receive the free parking, the employee would have to 
include the fair market value of such parking in the calculation of his gross 
income.124  In contrast, after the 1997 Act, the opposite was true.125  The 
Internal Revenue Service explained in a Private Letter Ruling that, where the 
employer offered employees $150 or free parking, the parking constituted a 
nontaxable fringe benefit.126  Thus, if an employee elected to receive the free 
parking in lieu of the $150, the employee would not have to include the fair 
market value of such parking in the calculation of his gross income.127 
For example, prior to the 1997 Act, if Phil’s employer offered him free 
parking or an extra $150 each paycheck, and Phil chose the free parking, he 
would have to include the fair market value of the parking as income received.  
But after the 1997 Act, if Phil’s employer offered him free parking or an extra 
$150 each paycheck, and Phil chose the free parking, he would not have to 
include the fair market value of the parking as income received.  Or, because 
of the 1992 Act, if Phil paid $150 for parking each month, and then his 
employer paid him back, Phil would not have to include those reimbursements 
in the calculation of his gross income.128 
Congress believed this amendment would convince employees to use their 
cars less because they would prefer cash over the alternative of the parking 
fringe benefit.129  In addition, the Joint Committee on Taxation’s General 
Explanation of Tax Legislation believed that the predicted preference by 
employees of cash over the parking benefit would result in environmental 
benefits due to the reduced automobile transportation.130  Thus, Congress 
attempted to create a disincentive to drive to work by creating an incentive to 
receive a nontaxable lump sum payment.  Contrary to the purpose of the 1997 
Act, however, employees overwhelmingly chose the parking benefit over the 
 
 123. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911, 106 Stat. 2276, 3012 
(1992). 
 124. See id.  “[T]he fair market value of a fringe benefit is the amount that an individual 
would have to pay for the particular fringe benefit in an arm’s-length transaction.”  Treas. Reg. § 
1.61-21(b) (1992). 
 125. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1072, 111 Stat. at 948. 
 126. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200347003 (Nov. 21, 2003); see Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 
1072, 111 Stat. at 948.  A Private Letter Ruling is a “written statement issued to a taxpayer by the 
IRS National Office that interprets and applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts.”  GRAETZ & 
SCHENK, supra note 18, at 73. 
 127. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200347003; see also Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1072, 111 Stat. 
at 948. 
 128. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
 129. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 721 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 198 (1997)); Kratzke, 
supra note 83, at 47. 
 130. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 721–22 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 198 (1997)). 
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cash payment, and thus, the congestion problem was only exacerbated.131  This 
provision surprisingly was never removed from the Code and remains 
controversial.132 
E. Mitigating the Current Disparity through the Green Routes to Work Act 
Although the Bailout Bill added bicycle transportation to qualified 
transportation fringe benefits, it did so inequitably.133  Under the current 
provision, employees are not permitted to exclude reimbursements for bicycle 
commuting expenses in addition to reimbursements for other alternative modes 
of transportation.134  Further, employees may exclude up to $2,100/year 
($175/month) in parking benefits135 or $1,200/year ($100/month) in commuter 
highway vehicle and transit pass benefits,136 whereas employees are only 
permitted to exclude $240/year ($20/month) in bicycle reimbursements.137  
Thus, employees who elect to receive the parking benefit may receive an 
additional $900 of tax-free benefit per year over those who use transit or 
$1,860 over those who receive bicycle reimbursements.  As stated earlier, 
under the 1992 Act, Congress allowed taxpayers to exclude both mass transit 
and carpooling benefits for the purpose of improving energy efficiency,138 so 
why would Congress exclude bicycle reimbursements from similar favorable 
treatment? 
As seen in this section, over the last several decades Congress has sought 
to alter transportation choices of employees through incentives within the Tax 
Code.  Both the 1992 Act and the 1997 Act were intended to reduce energy 
consumption and vehicle transportation, yet neither actually implemented 
 
 131. Id. at 722; Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47. 
 132. See, e.g., Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47.  See also I.R.C. § 132(f)(4) (Supp. II 2009). 
 133. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 211, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3840 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 134. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2) (Supp. II 2009). 
 135. Id. § 132(f)(2)(B) (“The amount of the fringe benefits which are provided by an 
employer to any employee and which may be excluded from gross income under subsection 
(a)(5) shall not exceed . . . $175 per month in the case of qualified parking.”). 
 136. Id. § 132(f)(2)(A). 
The amount of the fringe benefits which are provided by an employer to any employee 
and which may be excluded from gross income under subsection (a)(5) shall not 
exceed . . . $100 per month in the case of the aggregate of benefits described in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).  Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) 
describe transportation in a commuter highway vehicle and transit passes, respectively. 
Id. § 132(f)(1)(A)–(B). 
 137. Id. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (“The term ‘applicable annual limitation’ means, with respect to 
any employee for any calendar year, the product of $20 multiplied by the number of qualified 
bicycle commuting months during such year.”). 
 138. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911(b), 106 Stat. 2276, 3012–13 
(1992). 
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equal benefits for alternative modes of transportation.  And although the 
Bailout Bill successfully added bicycle transportation to the list of eligible 
qualified transportation benefits, the actual benefit to employees is trivial at 
best. 
The proposed Green Routes to Work Act would reduce some of the 
taxpayer bias toward parking benefits by increasing tax incentives to use 
alternative means of transportation.139  This Act would equalize the maximum 
amount excludable for the permitted combinations of alternative transportation 
methods and parking benefits to $230.140  Under the proposed Green Routes to 
Work Act, employees would be allowed to exclude reimbursements for both 
transit passes and bicycle expenses in the same month.141  Unfortunately, 
however, the proposed Green Routes to Work Act would not permit employees 
to exclude reimbursements for both carpooling and bicycle expenses, nor 
would it permit employees to exclude reimbursements for mass transit and 
carpooling and bicycle expenses.  I argue, however, that the proposed Green 
Routes to Work Act does not completely eliminate the inequity between the 
current treatment of other qualified transportation fringe benefits and bicycle 
transportation reimbursements.  I believe bicycle transportation benefits should 
be given the same treatment as mass transit and carpooling benefits under the 
Tax Code.   
III.  TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 
As explained earlier, tax deductions, exclusions, and credits are “tax 
expenditures.”142  It is important to consider the exclusion for bicycle 
commuting reimbursements in the context of a tax expenditure analysis 
because, as a doctrine, the tax expenditure analysis has been very influential in 
the legislative process.143  In fact, the tax “expenditure concept has been 
enshrined in federal law and [has] become part of the daily discourse of the 
national budget process.”144 
 
 139. Green Routes to Work Act, H.R. Res. 3271, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 140. Id. § 2(a).  Wendy Gerzog Shaller proposes that Congress should eliminate the parking 
exclusion all together.  Shaller, supra note 82, at 615.  Or, at the very least, Shaller proposes 
subjecting the benefit to nondiscrimination requirements.  Id.  Employers choosing to offer such a 
program would be required to provide the benefit to all employees, not just those who are highly 
compensated.  Id. 
 141. Green Routes to Work Act, §§ 2(a), 9. 
 142. See supra Part I.A. 
 143. Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural 
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993), reprinted in 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX ANTHOLOGY, at 67, 67 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 1997) (“Few academic 
doctrines can claim the intellectual and political success of tax expenditure analysis.”). 
 144. Id. at 68. 
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Historically, the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (Joint 
Committee) has been heavily influenced by former Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Policy Stanley Surrey’s scholarship on tax expenditures.145  Surrey first used 
the phrase “tax expenditures” in a 1967 speech and described them as “those 
special provisions of the federal income tax system which represent 
government expenditures made through that system to achieve various social 
and economic objectives.”146  These expenditures provide financial assistance 
by giving a tax reduction rather than direct aid.147  Consequently, tax 
reductions make certain behavior more attractive, which in turn, motivates 
taxpayers to engage in the desired behavior.148 
The Joint Committee has explained that examining these financial 
incentives through a tax expenditure analysis may shed light on how certain 
government funds are spent and what policy implications may subsequently 
arise.149  While it would be nearly impossible to predict all the ways expanding 
the current exclusion for bicycle transportation reimbursements would affect 
taxpayer behavior, nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider their expansion 
simultaneously with some of the general arguments for and against tax 
expenditures.  By addressing common tax expenditure analysis themes, while 
incorporating the historical treatment of similar benefit categories and the 
current inequitable tax treatment for bicycle transportation reimbursements, I 
argue that expansion of these tax incentives is socially and economically 
desirable. 
 
 145. See 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 3–4. 
 146. SURREY, supra note 48, at vii; Surrey, supra note 24, at 706. 
The federal income tax system consists really of two parts: one part comprises the 
structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax on individual and corporate 
net income; the second part comprises a system of tax expenditures under which 
Governmental financial assistance programs are carried out through special tax provisions 
rather than through direct Government expenditures.  This second system is grafted on the 
structure of the income tax proper; it has no basic relation to that structure and is not 
necessary to its operation.  Instead, the system of tax expenditures provides a vast subsidy 
apparatus that uses the mechanics of the income tax as a method of paying the subsidies. 
SURREY, supra note 48, at 6. 
 147. SURREY, supra note 48, at vii. 
 148. Surrey, supra note 24, at 711, 713.  See also Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 711 (“Tax 
preferences induce taxpayers to engage in an activity by making it less costly, just as penalties are 
designed to discourage activities by making them more costly.”). 
 149. 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 1 (The “[t]ax expenditure analysis can help 
both policymakers and the public to understand the actual size of government, the uses to which 
government resources are put, and the tax and economic policy consequences that follow from the 
implicit or explicit choices made in fashioning legislation.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] PEDALING TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE TAX-RIDE FOR CYCLISTS 443 
A. General Criticism of Tax Expenditures 
In general, tax incentives have been justified based on the assumption that 
taxpayers would not engage in the desired activity absent a financial 
incentive.150  Because of the purported importance of the desired activity, the 
government is unwilling to allow the free market to control the success or 
failure of certain policy considerations.151  This motivation can be seen in the 
Bailout Bill.152  The stated purpose of the Bailout Bill explains that Congress 
sought to provide stability, prevent disruption, protect taxpayers, and notably, 
“provide incentives for energy production and conservation.”153 
Consistent with the purpose of the Bailout Bill, Representative 
Blumenauer argues that it makes environmental, public health, and economic 
sense for Congress to expand the current incentives to employees for using 
alternative methods of transportation, like bicycles.154  Several statistics 
support Representative Blumenauer’s argument.  Specifically, employees who 
commute to work by bicycle save on average $1,825 on automobile-related 
expenses, use 145 fewer gallons of gas, and spend 50 fewer hours in traffic 
each year than those who drive.155  Numbers like these support the notion that, 
by encouraging more employees to ride bicycles to work through tax 
incentives, the federal government may be able to reduce taxpayers’ 
dependence on oil and ease traffic congestion in heavily populated areas. 
Despite arguments like Representative Blumenauer’s in favor of tax 
expenditures, critics argue that this, and similar government subsidies, are 
generally inefficient and inequitable.156  Other commentators have gone so far 
as to call tax expenditures “loopholes that need to be closed.”157 
One of Stanley Surrey’s main criticisms of tax expenditures is that they are 
generally less desirable than direct subsidies, as a means of achieving goals.158  
Surrey argues that it is inefficient to provide financial benefits through an 
indirect means, such as an exclusion through the Tax Code, instead of direct 
financial compensation—cash—for engaging in the desired behavior.  
 
 150. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 711. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 153. Id. 
 154. 155 CONG. REC. E1858 (daily ed. July 21, 2009) (statement of Rep. Blumenauer) 
(stating that “[i]f more Americans commute using alternative modes of transportation, we will see 
improvements in the economy, workplace productivity, and quality of life”). 
 155. Id. at E1858–E1859. 
 156. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 713. 
 157. Rosanne Altshuler & Robert D. Dietz, Reconsidering Tax Expenditure Estimation: 
Challenges and Reforms 1 (Rutgers Univ., Dep’t. of Econ., Working Paper No. 200804, 2008), 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/rut/rutres/200804.html. 
 158. Surrey, supra note 24, at 734–35. 
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However, I argue there are inherent benefits in approaching environmental 
goals, like encouraging bicycle transportation, through a tax expenditure 
offered through employers rather than a direct expenditure given straight to 
employees. 
As explained earlier in this Comment, the concept of tax subsidies 
distributed through employers to employees is not foreign.159  “Through the 
Internal Revenue Code, Congress implicitly defines, by design or by accident, 
what the nature of the employment relationship is, or can be.”160  Recently, this 
interaction between the tax code and employment relationships has come into 
the spotlight, and concerns have been raised about the economic effects of 
these subsidies.161  While some subsidies, like those for parking benefits, are 
particularly vulnerable to criticism, I argue employers may be better suited to 
address the transportation issue and encourage alternative methods of 
transportation, such as bicycles, for three reasons.162 
First, employers are in a better position than employees to lobby the 
government for improvements within the transportation system with less 
organizational cost than individual employees.163  From a purely bureaucratic 
standpoint, a single individual is much less likely to be able to achieve broad 
policies affecting national transportation issues than an employer, who is more 
likely to have the educational, financial, and political resources that are 
necessary to influence legislative decisions.  In other words, a single taxpayer 
lobbying for a tax incentive for them to ride their bicycle to work is hardly as 
persuasive as a single employer who can lobby on behalf of dozens, hundreds, 
or thousands of employees. 
Second, by subsidizing benefits, Congress encourages the creation of more 
employment relationships.164  For employees, regardless of what transportation 
method employees choose, the expense incurred for that transportation is 
considered “an expense of establishing or maintaining” that employment 
relationship.165  By providing tax incentives within these employer/employee 
relationships, Congress effectively reduces the costs for employees to enter and 
 
 159. See supra Part I.B. 
 160. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 1. 
 161. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 734. 
 162. Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 141, 197–98 (1998). 
 163. Id. at 198. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47.  “However, tax subsidization of more expensive forms of 
transportation [like automobile transportation through parking subsidies] from which a taxpayer 
derives increased personal (as opposed to trade or business) benefits suggests a substitution of a 
more costly benefit for another without actually facilitating creation of an employment 
relationship.”  Id. 
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maintain such relationships.166  For employers, subsidized benefits can help 
reduce employee turnover rates.167 
Third, Craig Oren suggests that another benefit of the employer/employee 
relationship is that the social atmosphere of the work environment may lend 
itself to encouraging transportation preferences based on the decisions of those 
around you.168  Thus, if many of your coworkers opt to take advantage of the 
exclusion for transit pass or bicycle reimbursement, you may be more likely to 
engage in similar behavior.  Oren explains: 
If I saw others successfully carpooling or using transit to get to work, I might 
well be influenced to do the same, just as my choice of car is affected by the 
preferences of my colleagues and neighbors.  The workplace—one of a 
declining number of arenas in which people meet—is an apt location for this 
kind of influence to take place.169 
But, in order to encourage businesses to participate in social programs, the 
“[g]overnment must be willing to meet business half way.”170  The proposed 
Green Routes to Work Act provides for significant employer incentives to 
promote and accommodate employee bicycle transportation.171 
Therefore, because of the unique nature of the employer/employee 
relationship, funneling financial incentives for environmental and 
transportation goals through employers is an efficient way of accomplishing 
those goals. 
B. Specific Criticisms of Tax Expenditures 
Aside from the general notion that tax incentives are less desirable than 
direct subsidies, Surrey argues there are four main defects with tax incentives: 
1) They provide windfalls for taxpayers who would engage in the activity 
anyway; 2) They are inequitable because they are worth more to high-income 
taxpayers; 3) They distort choices in the marketplace; and 4) They keep tax 
 
 166. Oren, supra note 162, at 198. 
 167. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 691. 
 168. Oren, supra note 162, at 198. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Surrey, supra note 24, at 716 (citing 115 CONG. REC. S5329, S5330 (daily ed. May 16, 
1969) (statement of Sen. Percy)).  But see id.  (countering Sen. Percy’s statement by arguing that 
the policy does not support the use of a tax incentive as opposed to a direct expenditure because it 
is focused on the need for government assistance in a particular area). 
 171. Green Routes to Work Act, H.R. Res. 3271, 111th Cong. § 8(a) (2009) (explaining that 
employers would be given a tax credit for “expenditures to provide bicycle access” in “an amount 
equal to 50 percent of so much of the eligible bicycle access expenditures for the taxable year as 
exceed $250 but do not exceed $10,250.”); id. § 10(a) (explaining expenses to remove 
“architectural and transportation barriers” to bicycle access may be treated as a deduction from 
gross income). 
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rates high because of reduced revenue.172  However, Surrey is careful to note 
that his disapproval of tax expenditures over direct expenditures is merely a 
general analysis, and thus, there may be particular cases in which direct 
expenditure programs “do not apply because special considerations are 
involved.”173 
In order to accurately determine whether a direct expenditure or a tax 
incentive is more desirable, a “cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness” analysis 
must be conducted.174  This section addresses each of Surrey’s four primary 
criticisms of tax expenditures and presents my argument for why the current 
favorable treatment of bicycle reimbursements within the Tax Code and the 
proposed Green Routes to Work Act fit within Surrey’s narrow exception to 
his general disfavor of tax expenditures.  I argue that these criticisms of tax 
expenditures in general are not applicable to the exclusion for bicycle 
commuting reimbursements.  Also, the social policy benefits support the 
current treatment of bicycle reimbursements as an exclusion rather than a 
deduction and even support extending the exclusion further. 
1. Response to the Concern of Creating a Windfall to Taxpayers 
Surrey’s first specific criticism of tax expenditures is that they create 
windfalls to taxpayers who would engage in certain behaviors absent a tax 
incentive.175  Beyond creating windfalls, Surrey argues these expenditures are 
also a waste of government funds.176  In response to the concern that the recent 
amendments provided by the Bailout Bill and the proposed amendment within 
the Green Routes to Work Act create windfalls to taxpayers, I argue that such a 
windfall does not exist.  Furthermore, these provisions may have the effect of 
mitigating the existing windfall created by the current exclusion for parking 
benefits created by the 1992 Act and subsidized employer parking under the 
1997 Act.177 
There is little doubt that commuting to work is a necessary part of 
employment for many employees.178  The way that employees choose to 
commute, however, is their choice.  Under the current tax regime, employees 
 
 172. Surrey, supra note 24, at 719–26. 
 173. Id. at 735. 
 174. Id. at 714–15. 
 175. Id. at 719 (arguing tax incentives can be pleasant for people who would have engaged in 
the incentivized behavior regardless of whether or not there was an incentive to do so).  See also 
Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 714. 
 176. Surrey, supra note 24, at 719.  See also Part III.B.4 for a discussion about the criticism 
that tax expenditures result in reduced revenue for the federal government. 
 177. See supra Parts II.C–D. 
 178. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 723. 
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choose to drive to work.  Almost 80% of commuters drive to work alone.179  
Arguably, driving to work is an activity and/or expense that employees are 
likely to engage in without a tax incentive.180  By excluding employer 
reimbursements for parking expenses from taxable income and allowing 
employers to provide tax-free parking to employees, the 1992 and 1997 Acts 
reduced the expenses incurred by employees driving to work.181  Contrary to 
the purpose of tax expenditures—encouraging socially desirable behavior that 
taxpayers would not engage in absent a financial incentive182—the parking 
subsidy creates “significant windfalls” for those taxpayers who would drive to 
work and pay for parking without any tax incentive.183 
In contrast to driving, less than 5% of trips to work are made using public 
transit,184 and less than 10% of all daily trips are made by walking or 
bicycling.185  Thus, current incentives for carpooling, mass transit, and bicycle 
commuting transportation do not create windfalls for a large percentage of 
employees commuting to work because employees generally do not utilize 
alternative transportation methods.  Moreover, in the context of another 
alternative mode of transportation, carpooling, studies show that commuters in 
general are more likely to carpool when there are incentives for them to do 
so.186 
Thus, contrary to Surrey’s general argument, proposed expansion of the 
present benefits would not necessarily have a windfall effect.  Increasing the 
benefits afforded to employees who commute to work by bicycle could directly 
reduce traffic congestion, if the incentives or disincentives for driving are 
substantial enough.  But even if taxpayers were to receive a windfall for 
alternative transportation methods, unlike the parking subsidy, such windfalls 
would still support positive social activities.187 
 
 179. Mann, supra note 16, at 588 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEANS OF 
TRANSPORTATION TO WORK FOR WORKERS 16 YEARS AND OVER, 2002 AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY (2002), available at http://factfinder.census.gov). 
 180. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 723. 
 181. See supra notes 118–19, 126–27 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 183. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 723. 
 184. Mann, supra note 16, at 613 (citing John Pucher & John L. Renne, Socioeconomics of 
Urban Travel: Evidence from the 2001 NHTS, TRANSP. Q., Summer 2003, at 49, 49). 
 185. Id. at 616 (citing Pucher & Renne, supra note 184, at 51). 
 186. Sharon Sarmiento, Household, Gender, and Travel, in U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. 
HIGHWAY ADMIN., OFFICE OF HIGHWAY INFO. MGMT., WOMEN’S TRAVEL ISSUES: 
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE, FHWA-PL-97-024, at 37, 44 (1996), 
available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/womens/wtipage.htm. 
 187. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing social benefits of bicycle incentives). 
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2. Response to the Concern of Inequity 
Surrey’s second specific criticism of tax expenditures is that they are 
inequitable.188  Underlying this notion of equity are the principles of fairness, 
equality, and distributive justice.189  Tax expenditures have been perceived as 
inequitable when they disproportionately benefit higher-income taxpayers.190  
These critics believe that tax incentives “rarely provid[e] benefits to taxpayers 
who do not have taxable incomes and perversely provid[e] greater benefits to 
taxpayers with the most income.”191  However, such concerns are not present 
with bicycle commuting reimbursements. 
First, unlike some deductions, the bicycle reimbursement provision does 
not require taxpayers to have a minimum adjusted gross income to receive its 
benefits.  As explained earlier in this comment, the bicycle reimbursement 
provision is an exclusion as opposed to a deduction.192  Thus, all employees 
who wish to take advantage of this provision can because it is predicated on 
the presence of gross income, which all employees have because they receive 
wages from their employer.  Moreover, because there are quantifiable 
maximum exclusions, they are less likely to disproportionately benefit a 
higher-income cross-section than other limitless tax expenditures. 
From a sociological perspective, increasing the present incentives to utilize 
bicycle transportation193 could have substantial benefits on certain 
demographics because commuting time, costs, patterns, and distances differ 
based on age, race, and income level.194  Despite the rationale used to justify 
qualifying transportation expenses as inherently personal,195 “[n]ot every 
taxpayer would agree that he has a meaningful personal choice of where to 
live.”196  Empirical data of transportation patterns support the premise that 
some racial groups and low income employees may be more likely to take 
advantage of and, thus, benefit from, the exclusion.197 
For example, research indicates that women (excluding African-American 
women) generally work closer to home and have shorter commuting times then 
men.198  In addition, women are more likely to commute (both short and long 
 
 188. Surrey, supra note 24, at 720.  See also Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 713. 
 189. Dagan, supra note 17, at 219. 
 190. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 713. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra Part I.A. 
 193. See infra text accompanying notes 212–18 (discussing Pigouvian Taxation). 
 194. Dagan, supra note 17, at 220–22. 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 81–85 (explaining that, historically, commuting 
expenses have been treated as inherently personal). 
 196. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 46. 
 197. Dagan, supra note 17, at 222–24. 
 198. Id. at 222 (citing Ibipo Johnston, Location, Race, and Labor Force Participation: 
Implications for Women of Color, in U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 186, at 337, 339); Sara 
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trips) to low-income jobs than men.199  If one assumes, in general, that the 
closer an employee lives to their work, the more likely they are to commute to 
work by bicycle then, theoretically, women may be more likely to commute to 
work by bicycle then men. 
Moreover, “individuals often trade off money for time and flexibility.”200  
This trade off may also create more of a financial incentive for women to 
utilize the bicycle transportation provision than men.  Sharon Sarmiento has 
theorized that women may find less expensive modes of transportation more 
attractive because women generally have lower incomes than men.201  In fact, 
studies show that women are more likely to use mass transit than men.202  
Although women may not typically be more likely than men to ride bicycles to 
work, when considered in the context of their shorter commuting distances and 
the financial incentive, women may be predisposed to take advantage of tax 
benefits afforded for bicycle transportation.203 
Research also indicates that African-Americans may be more likely to take 
advantage of an expansion of the current alternative transportation method 
benefits.  In general, minority groups have longer commute times than 
Caucasians.204  For African-Americans, their longer commute time may be 
explained by the “spatial mismatch hypothesis”: 
 
McLafferty & Valerie Preston, Gender, Race and Commuting Among Service Sector Workers, 43 
PROF. GEOGRAPHER 1, 7 (1991)).  See also U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., JOURNEY TO WORK: 2000, at 
5–6 (2004); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and 
the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 173, 188–89 (2001).  The reason for the disparity has been 
attributed to the fact that women “generally earn lower incomes and work shorter hours, so it does 
not pay to commute long distances.”  Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 41.  However, marital status 
also contributes to the length of a woman’s commute time, as married women have shorter 
commutes than those who are unmarried.  Id. 
 199. Dagan, supra note 17, at 222 (citing Johnston, supra note 198, at 339; McLafferty & 
Preston, supra note 198, at 7). 
 200. Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 43. 
 201. Id.  See also Dagan, supra note 17, at 222 (citing Johnston, supra note 198, at 345–46) 
(“[W]omen are more likely than men to have ‘compromised’ and ‘constrained’ commutes (i.e., 
short and long trips to low-income jobs), while men are more likely than women to have either 
convenient (i.e., less than twenty minutes) or compensatory commutes (i.e., long commutes to 
high income jobs.)”). 
 202. Oren, supra note 162, at 162 (citing ALAN E. PISARSKI, URBAN LAND INST., 
COMMUTING IN AMERICA II: THE SECOND NATIONAL REPORT ON COMMUTING PATTERNS AND 
TRENDS 50, 60 (1996)). 
 203. But see Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 43 (explaining a woman’s choice of their mode of 
transportation are “varied and location-specific” because of concerns relating to domestic 
responsibilities).  The choice depends “a lot on the transportation options available in each 
location.”  Id.  Also, commuters in general are more likely to carpool when they commute long 
distances and when incentives for doing so are available.  Id. at 44. 
 204. Dagan, supra note 17, at 222 (citing Johnston, supra note 198, at 339; McLafferty & 
Preston, supra note 198, at 9). 
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African American inner-city residents have poorer spatial access to jobs than 
do other workers, because of their concentration in segregated residential areas 
distant from and poorly connected to major centers of employment growth.  
Lack of access leads to high rates of unemployment and, for persons able to 
overcome spatial barriers and find work, to long journeys to work.205 
The longer journey to work is due, at least in part, to the fact that African-
Americans depend on slower methods of transportation, like public transit.206 
Based on their statistical dependence on alternative modes of 
transportation, increasing financial benefits afforded to alternative modes of 
transportation through qualified fringe benefits, could reduce the expense and 
hardship African-Americans face when commuting to work.  Further, these 
statistics provide an illustration of why employees should be permitted to 
concurrently exclude commuter highway vehicle and transit pass and bicycle 
reimbursements. Because African-Americans are more likely to use public 
transit, they might also be more likely to take advantage of an expansion of the 
current bicycle commuting reimbursement benefit. 
Therefore, based on the possible effects expansion of bicycle 
reimbursements could have on women and African Americans, and contrary to 
concerns under the tax expenditure analysis, adoption of the proposed Green 
Routes to Work Act or similar legislation and further expansion of tax benefits 
for alternative means of transportation to work may not disproportionately 
benefit higher income employees. 
3. Response to Concern of Market Distortion 
Surrey’s third specific criticism about tax incentives in general is that they 
distort market choices.207  Surrey stated that “even within the area sought to be 
benefited by the tax incentive, the design of the incentive may push or pull in 
unneutral directions, which may or may not be desirable.”208  Concededly, one 
example of the harm of distorting market choices is the 1997 Act,209 which has 
been frequently criticized.210  However, even though distortion of the market 
place can be viewed as a criticism of tax incentives, in the context of bicycle 
reimbursements, it may also be viewed as a benefit because the purpose of tax 
incentives is to alter current market conditions.211  In this Section, I will draw 
 
 205. Johnston, supra note 198, at 339. 
 206. Id. at 344. 
 207. Surrey, supra note 24, at 725. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 130–32 (describing the unexpected consequences of 
the 1997 Act). 
 210. See, e.g., Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 685 (criticizing the 1997 amendments for 
distorting market choices and creating unwanted side-effects like urban congestion and air 
pollution). 
 211. Surrey, supra note 24, at 725. 
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distinctions between the 1997 Act and tax expenditures to encourage 
alternative modes of transportation generally and the Green Routes to Work 
Act specifically; and ultimately, I conclude that changing the market is one of 
the premier benefits to expanding the current incentives for bicycle 
transportation. 
In an article critiquing the 1997 Act,212 Maureen Cavanaugh advanced the 
proposition that in addition to the tax expenditure analysis, Congress should 
also consider the principles of Pigouvian taxation when determining whether 
or not a particular tax incentive should be implemented.213  Pigouvian taxation 
was advanced by A.C. Pigou and F.P. Ramsey in the twentieth century.214  
Under the theory of Pigouvian taxation, tax incentives and disincentives are an 
optimal way of either encouraging behavior that benefits society or, 
alternatively, discouraging behavior for which the social costs outweigh the 
individual benefits.215  Essentially, taxes can effectively address social 
problems by placing a monetary valuation on behavior that has positive or 
negative social consequences.216  On one hand, the tax code can be an effective 
way of mitigating the disparity between the benefit received by the taxpayer 
and the costs borne by society caused by a particular behavior, by reallocating 
the loss to the taxpayer through tax disincentives.217  On the other hand, the tax 
code can be used to lower the cost of behavior to an individual that benefits 
society.218 
Because of the failed attempt to address urban congestion and 
transportation issues through the 1997 Act, now taxpayers receive a subsidy 
for commuting.219  Cavanaugh argues this subsidy is inconsistent with the 
theory of Pigouvian taxation because urban congestion and transportation costs 
are examples of activities in which social costs outweigh private benefits and, 
thus, should not be incentivized.220 
Commuting contributes to “urban congestion, reduced air quality, and 
increased gasoline consumption.”221  On any given day, 200,000,000 vehicles 
travel across nearly the 4,000,000 miles of roadways located in the United 
 
 212. See supra Part II.D (discussing the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997). 
 213. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 685–86. 
 214. Id. at 688. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 689. 
 217. Id. at 688. 
 218. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 688. 
 219. See supra notes 126 and accompanying text (explaining the 1997 Act). 
 220. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 688.  Roberta Mann also argues that “[t]he transportation 
fringe benefit of tax-free parking exacerbates urban transportation problems.”  Mann, supra note 
16, at 637. 
 221. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 688. 
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States.222  In addition, commuting to work represents 26% of all household 
vehicle trips and 33% of total vehicle miles traveled.223  These high 
percentages of vehicle use are also correlated with statistics indicating that 
trips to work are more concentrated in time and tend to produce the most 
traffic congestion.224 
Consequences of this high volume of traffic pose serious health risks to our 
citizens that are often unseen.225  It is no wonder that the emissions from these 
vehicles in cities account for 95% of carbon monoxide emissions.226  Such 
emissions have been shown by the EPA to have shocking effects.227  Each year 
50% of the 1700 to 2700 cancer deaths caused by hazardous air pollutants are 
caused by emissions from “mobile sources such as highway vehicles.”228 
Despite the failures of the 1997 Act, Cavanaugh concedes that optimal 
taxation may require a process of trial and error.229  Thus, perhaps Congress’s 
error with the 1997 Act should not be viewed as an example to support the 
position taken by critics of tax expenditures, but should rather be viewed as an 
error which can be corrected.  Cavanaugh suggested under Pigouvian taxation, 
either reducing or eliminating employer-subsidized parking would reduce 
“pollution and congestion while improving air quality, land use, and fuel 
 
 222. Oren, supra note 162, at 150–51. 
 223. Id. at 163 (citing PISARSKI, supra note 202, at 3).  On average, “Americans drive their 
cars about one hour per day.”  Oren, supra note 162, at 151 (citing TRANS. RES. BOARD, 
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: ADDRESSING THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF MOTOR VEHICLE 
TRANSPORTATION ON CLIMATE AND ECOLOGY 1-1, 2-1 (1997) (on file with the Stanford 
Environmental Law Journal)).  Further, some studies estimate that Americans lose the equivalent 
of an entire work week each year due to urban congestion and transportation.  Cavanaugh, supra 
note 16, at 717 n.146. 
 224. Oren, supra note 162, at 163 (citing ANTHONY DOWNS, STRUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING 
WITH PEAK-HOUR TRAFFIC CONGESTION 13–16 (1992)).  William Kratzke believes that 
“[e]mployee-caused congestion suggests that there may be too much commuting in private 
automobiles.”  Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47.  Kratzke proposes that Congress should tax parking 
instead of subsidize it.  Id. 
 225. See Oren, supra note 162, at 151 (discussing the health consequences of carbon 
monoxide emissions). 
 226. Id. at 151 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND 
EMISSIONS TREND REPORT 1995, at 10 (1996)). 
 227. Id. at 152–53 (citing Implementation and Enforcement of Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Commerce, 104th Cong. 209 (1995) (statement of Mary Nichols)). 
 228. Id. at 152–53 (citing Implementation and Enforcement of Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Commerce, supra note 227). 
 229. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 717 (citing William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the 
Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 315 (1972)). 
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conservation.”230  Alternatively, parking policies and subsidized transit costs 
could be used in combination to encourage the use of public transit.231 
Another means of correcting the mistakes of the 1997 Act would be to 
expand the current exclusions for bicycle transportation reimbursements.  In 
addition, increasing incentives for bicycle transportation and other alternative 
transportation methods may mitigate some of the negative consequences of our 
current “[t]ax code that favors driving and suburban life.”232  Both the recent 
Bailout Bill amendments and the proposed Green Routes to Work Act are 
consistent with the theory of Pigouvian taxation.233  Allowing tax benefits for 
those who commute by bike is a way of encouraging behavior with positive 
social benefits, which is consistent with the goal of Pigouvian taxation.234  
Bicycle riding is both pollution free and a “healthful” mode of 
transportation.235  Representative Blumenauer argues through the Green Routes 
to Work Act, Congress would be supporting employees “who wish to use 
environmentally friendly, active transportation modes that save them money in 
the long run, such as public transit, carpooling, biking, walking and 
telecommuting.”236  Moreover, by using “fiscal policy to encourage 
environmentally constructive activities and to discourage destructive ones, we 
can steer the economy in a sustainable direction.”237  Our nation’s dependence 
on automobiles has caused environmental and social damage, but this damage 
can be corrected by using the federal income tax system.238 
Therefore, based on the theory of Pigouvian taxation, the Green Routes to 
Work Act should be adopted, the current maximum excludable reimbursement 
 
 230. Id. at 720 (citing Donald C. Shoup, Cashing out Free Parking, 36 TRANSP. Q. 351, 354–
58 (1982)). 
 231. Id. (citing David Merriman, How Many Parking Spaces Does it Take to Create One 
Additional Transit Passenger?, 28 REG. SCI. & URB. ECON. 565, 566 (1998)).  For example, 
subsidized or free parking at public transit stops has been demonstrated to increase transit 
ridership.  Id. (citing Merriman, supra, at 566). 
 232. Michael Lewyn, Campaign of Sabotage: Big Government’s War Against Public 
Transportation, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 259, 282 (2001). 
 233. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, § 211, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3840; Green Routes to Work Act, H.R. Res. 3271, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 234. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 211, 122 Stat. at 3840; Cavanaugh, 
supra note 16, at 688. 
 235. Mann, supra note 16, at 616. 
 236. 155 Cong. Rec. E1858 (daily ed. July 21, 2009) (statement of Rep. Blumenauer).  Cf. 
Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 711 (citing Surrey, supra note 24, at 713) (“Any tax preference 
serves as an incentive, providing a monetary benefit to make the subsidized activity more 
palatable to taxpayers.  Tax preferences induce taxpayers to engage in an activity by making it 
less costly, just as penalties are designed to discourage activities by making them more costly.”). 
 237. Mann, supra note 16, at 621 (quoting LESTER R. BROWN, ECO-ECONOMY: BUILDING AN 
ECONOMY FOR THE EARTH 234–35 (2001)). 
 238. Id. at 620–21. 
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for bicycles should be increased, and employees should be permitted to 
exclude bicycle commuting reimbursements, commuter highway vehicle, and 
transit pass benefits concurrently. 
4. Response to Concern of Reduced Revenue 
Finally, the reduction in revenue to the federal government forms the basis 
for Surrey’s fourth specific criticism of tax expenditures.239  Surrey argues that 
tax incentives have the effect of keeping tax rates high because they reduce 
revenue for the Federal Government.240  Any exclusions, including those for 
transportation fringe benefits, result in less revenue for the government through 
the federal income tax. 241  Less revenue results in higher tax rates to account 
for the revenue lost because of tax benefits.242 
Because most tax expenditures do not place a maximum on how much a 
taxpayer can earn through the expenditure, it is difficult to predict how much 
the particular incentive will cost the government in lost revenue.243  However, 
unlike the tax expenditures criticized by Surrey, all qualified transportation 
fringe benefits have strict maximum amounts excludable from an employee’s 
gross income.244  By looking at previous filings by demographic, it is feasible 
to estimate the potential maximum loss by multiplying the number of taxable 
returns by the maximum exclusion.245 
In 2006, the exclusion for qualified employee parking cost an estimated 
$2.73 billion dollars.246  During the same year, the exclusion of transit passes 
cost an estimated $550 million dollars.247  It is necessary to note that the total 
lost revenue due to the parking exclusion is offset a little bit by the federal fuel 
tax.248  However, the offset is not significant enough to neutralize the other 
negative effects driving has on our country.249  Some costs were mentioned in 
the previous section, but others include: the revenue spent by the federal 
 
 239. Surrey, supra note 24, at 725–26. 
 240. Id. at 725–26. 
 241. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 111–12. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Surrey, supra note 24, at 726. 
 244. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2) (2006). 
 245. For example, in 2007, 88,723,000 taxable returns were filed.  2008–2012 ESTIMATES, 
supra note 30, at 70. 
 246. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 46 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2006, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 324–25 (2005)).  
In 2005, the exclusion for qualified employee parking cost an estimated $2.59 billion in revenue.  
Gazur, supra note 53, at 1006–07. 
 247. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 46 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 246, at 
324–25.  In 2005, the exclusion for employer-provided transit passes cost an estimated $550 
million in revenue.  Gazur, supra note 53, at 1007. 
 248. Lewyn, supra note 232, at 282–83. 
 249. Id. 
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government on highway maintenance; the costs of increased air pollution; the 
burden on publicly funded medical care due to car accidents; and the costs to 
enforce traffic and parking laws.250 
The estimated total expenses for qualified transportation fringe benefits 
support the proposition that the bicycle commuting exclusion is an inexpensive 
means of achieving legitimate social policy goals.251  Although the bicycle 
commuting exclusion could cost the Internal Revenue Service an estimated $1 
million a year, that amount is tiny in comparison to the expense incurred by the 
Internal Revenue Service for reimbursements for qualified parking expenses 
and transit passes.252  Therefore, the reduction in revenue should not justify 
eliminating or refusing to expand current tax incentives for bicycle 
transportation. 
Based on the preceding analysis, there are “special considerations” present 
in the context of bicycle reimbursements that are not present with other 
frequently criticized tax expenditures.253  As stated earlier in this Comment, by 
equalizing the maximum excludable benefit for all types of transportation 
fringe benefits, Congress could eliminate some of the bias that acts as an 
incentive to encourage taxpayers to choose parking benefits over other 
alternative means of transportation.254 
CONCLUSION 
Through the discussion of the historical treatment of similar employee 
commuting benefits and the application of a tax expenditure analysis, this 
comment sought to highlight the inequities and negative social policies 
reflected in our Tax Code. After looking back at the historical treatment of 
similar employee commuting benefits, it is clear that as we go forward into the 
next decade, we must change the current treatment of transportation fringe 
benefits under the Tax Code.   
As stated in the introduction, our tax laws reflect our vision of who we are 
as a society and how we perceive ourselves.255  Under our current tax laws, the 
generous parking subsidies reward fuel consumption and pollution, while 
concurrently discouraging commuting by mass transit, carpools, and bicycles.  
To more accurately reflect our nation’s commitment to resolving the global 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. As contrasted to the fringe benefits of health and pension benefits which are excluded 
from an employee’s gross income and also constitute one of the largest tax expenditures.  
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 104. 
 252. Gordon, supra note 6, at B1. 
 253. Surrey, supra note 24, at 735. 
 254. Moreover, the government could save billions of dollars by eliminating the controversial 
parking subsidy altogether. 
 255. Dagan, supra note 17, at 188. 
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energy crisis and to reducing our nation’s dependence on fuel, the Tax Code 
needs to be reformed.  Specifically, the maximum nontaxable reimbursement 
for bicycle commuting expenses should be increased.  Further, employees 
should be permitted to receive nontaxable benefits for bicycle commuting 
expenses and commuter highway vehicle and transit pass benefits 
concurrently.  Such changes would not only eliminate the bias existing in the 
current code in favor of parking benefits which encourage socially undesirable 
behavior, but would also act as an incentive for employees to choose 
alternative methods of transportation. 
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